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Just as the US has a founding document – The Constitution – the states themselves have their own
constitutions. But what influences how and when these documents are altered? In new research,
Adam Cayton compares the partisan makeup of state legislatures in every year since 1834 to the
year in which a state’s constitution was enacted to see when they are replaced. He finds that a
state’s constitution is more likely to be replaced when the constitution includes a large amount of
policy content and the composition of the legislature has changed.
Governments do not last forever, and while war and revolution are the most dramatic causes of
institutional death, in the US, political systems are replaced peacefully, and by the very people who work within
them. Social scientists, historians, policy makers, and founders of governments devote a great deal of thought and
ink to identifying the kinds of institutions that are stable over the long term, and rightly so, but to understand why
some institutions last longer than others it is not enough to focus on their characteristics. We also need to
understand how those characteristics influence the people who live under them to try to keep or replace the
institution. Thinking about institutional lifespans from this perspective causes us to reframe it as an interesting
puzzle: Why would politicians, who have succeeded under the existing rules of the game, collectively decide to
change those rules? This happens more often than one would think, and a possible explanation is that the rules
prevent them from using elected office to accomplish the goals that led them to seek that office in the first place. A
common source of this problem is when institutions deny politicians authority over certain policies.
A good way to test this proposition is to compare the lifespans of constitutions, a nearly ubiquitous institution among
large political units. It is tempting to view constitutions as high minded statements of ideology, values, or political
culture, and as documents that are worthy of reverence and above the political fray. To do so, however, is to
misunderstand how constitutions are used in most states, whether in the international system or in federations such
as the United States. Constitutions define the rules under which politicians and interest groups compete for power
and create policy. These rules by their nature give advantages to some and hinder others. It is simply unrealistic to
expect political actors, who are strategic in crafting and voting on policy, structuring executive agencies, designing
electoral and legislative procedures, and organizing political parties, to not have the same approach when it comes
to revising constitutions.
In new research, I find that when state constitutions are more policy focused, they are more likely to be changed
when the state’s legislature becomes more and more different in terms of party affiliation from how it was when the
original document was drafted.
While all constitutions are political documents, some are more likely to be affected by factional conflict than others.
Constitutions define the internal framework of most democratic systems, but may also include more specific
provisions that directly set policy, making the policy difficult or impossible to change by normal legislative means.
This is good for those who like the policy because it places it out of reach of their political opponents. For politicians
who took office after the constitution was created, and who disapprove of the policy, this kind of constitutional
content impedes their goals and thwarts the perceived will of the voters. If enough politicians share this frustration
they may decide to invest the time and effort to replace a constitution. Political institutions that limit the policies that
can be enacted and were created by people with different preferences from current policy makers face greater risk
of being replaced or revised. These policy-laden, or “particularistic,” constitutions do not last as long as their
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counterparts that focus primarily on the framework of government because they are more likely to be replaced as
politicians’ preferences change.
The 50 US states provide a unique opportunity to study this proposition. The US Constitution allows states to design
their own institutions, provided only that they maintain a “republican form of government.” States occasionally use
this freedom to undertake a wholesale replacement of their governmental framework. Another scholar has compiled
a dataset measuring the amount of policy specific content in US state constitutions. Less straightforward is
measuring change in the preferences of politicians in each state. The best feasible way to do this is to use
information on the partisan composition of each state legislature, which is available from 1834. By measuring the
composition of a state legislature the year its constitution went into effect and in each subsequent year, it is possible
to capture how much a state’s political elite diverges, in a given year, from the time its constitution was enacted.
Party affiliation does not mean the same thing in every state and cannot be directly tied to ideology in any consistent
way in the United States across this entire period, but change in the partisan composition of a legislature always
reflects some kind of political change and it has the advantage of being recorded for most of US history.
Modeling the relationships between constitutional particularism, partisan change, and the risk of replacement lends
support to the argument above. The chances that a state constitution will be replaced in a given year go up by over
40 percentage points for every 10 percent change in party seat shares, and the chances of replacement are
between 58 and 79 percentage points greater for every additional 10 percent of policy-specific content. Closer
examination shows that partisan change has no effect on the risk of replacement when a state’s constitution has no
policy-specific content, and states with lots of policy content are at no greater risk of replacement when the
composition of the legislature remains constant. It is only in those states where the constitution includes a large
amount of policy content and the composition of the legislature changes that replacement is more likely. The
takeaway is that if politicians enshrine their policy preferences in the highest law of the land it may be safer from
legislative meddling, but over the long term such action may lead their frustrated successors to totally revise the
government.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Why Are Some Institutions Replaced while Others Persist? Evidence from State
Constitutions’ in State Politics and Policy Quarterly.
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor
the London School of Economics.
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